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My presentation will focus deliberately on one element in the debate on
(international) water management – the symbolic dimension of water. This symbolic
dimension adds an element to the value of water that makes rational water management
more difficult – independent from the question whether we try to use a pure regulatory or
a market-based approach to water management. This does not mean that attempts to make
water allocation more rational through the use of market mechanisms are not useful. But
advocates of market mechanisms must be aware of this additional value dimension of
water that gives the value of water a volatility that goes beyond the exchange-value of
commodified water. Whereas this additional dimension of water makes rational water
management more difficult it contains also more potential than just efficient production
of an important economic commodity. Trans-boundary water management and politics
can contribute to re-inventing political community and democracy on a transnational
scale.
Because this is the basic message to this panel my presentation will be very much
focused into this direction leaving aside many important aspects of water management in
the regions I am looking at. The River Rhine Regime – and to a lesser extend – the Lake
Constance Regime – are widely studied international regimes and we have highly
distinguished scholars at this conference who have studied those regimes and know
probably much more about the management institution than I do. My deliberately specific
and therefore rather narrow focus is hopefully accepted as legitimate in the sense that I do
concentrate on something which provides additional insight to other contributions that
will be made at the conference.
My presentation proceeds as follows.
First, I would like to share some insights from Western European experiences
with transboundary water management. I will very briefly mention the most important
issues in water policy in the River Rhine basin and the Lake Constance basin touching
the topics, the progress made and the most important triggers of such progress. Hereby I
would like to stress the importance of highly visible events/accidents and of highly
symbolic campaigns in the success of the international water regimes.
See transparency 1.
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Transparency 1.

Issues and Progress of the International River Rhine Regime
o
o
o
o
o

Chloride: international regime not successful, but the problem has been reduced
because of changes in the economic environment
Chemical Pollution: slow but steady progress, as a result of national, European
and River Rhine regime activities
Industrial security and emergency plans: strong progress after a major accident
1986
Ecology: major progress in revitalization of ecosystems with the help of a highly
visible campaign to reinstall salmon (“Salmon 2000”)
Flood control: integration of this highly controversial issue of two disastrous
floods in the mid-1990s

Issues and Progress of the International Lake Constance Regime
o

Eutrophication: full turn-around after the riparian countries spent about € 4 billion
from 1970 to 2000
o Industrial security and emergency plans: the trans-national water conservation
coalition has been able to impede major development projects (oil pipe line, oil
storage in the Alps, development of the High Rhine into a major waterway,
transfer of water into other watersheds)
o Chemical pollution: strictest emission standards for motor boats in the world
o Ecology: ecosystem approach since the mid-1980s, massive re-naturalization
programs for the shoreline
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Second, I will focus on the role of markets in water policy in my case studies by
using a broad definition of “market mechanisms.” Included are various attempts to solve
water management problems with the help of economic instruments such as :
•

payments of the beneficiary to the polluter in order to stop the pollution of water
(Coase solutions),

•

water transfers across regions in combination with financial payments (different
types, one was implemented, another one not)

•

specific fees on water consumption

See transparency 2.
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Transparency 2.

The Role of Markets Mechanisms
o

Attempt to solve the Chloride problem of the Rhine by payments of the
beneficiary country (Netherlands) to the polluting country (France) -> failure of
an attempt for a Coase solution

o

Attempt to transfer water from Lake Constance to the Neckar (Stuttgart) in order
to make the Neckar navigable (1960s) –> failure of an attempt for inter-basin
water transfers for industrial expansion

o

At the same time a large municipality-controlled water agency started to deliver
water from Lake Constance to the capital of Baden-Württemberg and to many
other parts of the Land, 3 Mio people are consuming Lake Constance water now –
in exchange (no explicit connection) the Land Baden-Württemberg heavily
subsidised the building of sewage treatment plant in the Lake Constance area
(population about 500 000) –> success of water (inter-basin) water transfers

o

In 1996, Baden-Württemberg introduced a specific fee on water consumption in
order to pay a subsidy for farmers who have to reduce their use of fertilizers ->
success in implementing a “user pays” system, instead of only regulating the
polluters
No real water markets installed (no scarcity in the area of origin)
The legitimacy of inter -basin water transfers depends on its usage
Economic instruments lead to a change from “polluter pays” principle to a “user
pays principle”
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Third, after a brief discussion when and why these approaches have failed and
when and why they have been successful I point to another “market mechanism”: In
contrast to many water management specialists I purport that institutional complexity and
“institutional competition” can be a positive element in water management – under
specific circumstances!
I will try to demonstrate this by referring to the many trans-boundary institutions
in the Lake Constance area and the positive role that the competition among them played
for policy innovation and for breakthroughs in trans-boundary negotiations.
See transparency 3.
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Transparency 3.

Institutions Involved in Trans-boundary Water Governance at Lake Constance

Intergovernmental Commissions (international treaty)
• Shipping Commission
• Water Protection Commission
• Spatial Planning Commission
Trans-national Coalitions
• Waterworks
• Environmentalists
• Chambers of Commerce
• Tourism Organizations
Institutions of trans-boundary regionalism
• Institutionalized meetings of sub-national government leaders
• Association of leading political and civic leaders
• Meetings of the parliamentarians
• Association of the municipalities
+ INTERREG (financial programs from the European Union for
trans-boundary cooperation)
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Note: Institutional competition in the sense I define it here embodies a very
different logic as the public choice approach applies it is advocacy for institutional
competition. First, not the same kinds of institutions compete for consumers to provide
public service (exit and choice logic) leading to the most efficient production, but quite
different kinds of institutions compete for legitimacy (loyalty and voice logic) leading to
policy innovations.
The following part of the presentation takes a further look at the “specific
circumstances” under which institutional competition makes a positive contribution to
water management and policy innovation. Furthermore, this part is intended as a
comment to the paper that Charles Howe and Helen Ingram are presenting.
I will start with the specification of the circumstances under which “institutional
competition” is leading towards progress and policy innovations in transboundary water
management. It is in those social contexts where water is attributed with a positive “sign
value.”
See transparency 4.
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Transparency 4.

Water has a “sign value”

Exchange value:
• price/commodity
• supply and demand
• rational calculation

Sign value:
• image/identity
• social and technical constructions
• emotional reactions

If water has a positive “sign value” it
• is a symbol for trans-national community building
• signals a common identity and connected interests
• creates a “sense of belonging”
• determines the image of a region and can be used as a marketing tool (both for
political and economic actors)
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“Sign value” is a term I borrow from Lash & Urry (1994)1. They pit the postmodern concept of “sign value” against the modern concept of “exchange value.”
Whereas the exchange-value of water can be calculated, expressed in terms of general
utility (monetized prices) and traded, the sign-value of water is fuzzier and refers to the
image associated with it. An image is a very emergent phenomenon depending on social
trends/constructions and therefore its market value is quite volatile. Furthermore, if water
has a sign-value water politics goes beyond the rational calculation and political
bargaining. It touches the identity of individuals and communities and triggers emotional
reactions that enhance the value of the issue at stake. This additional value can be helpful
or it can be harmful, as the following examples show.
Whereas the River Rhine has been had a very negative “sign value” in
representing the competition for dominance in Europe between Germany and France in
the 19th Century and the beginning of the 20th Century, the River Rhine and Lake
Constance have gotten primer symbols for the unification of Europe after Second World
War. In the sixties and seventies and even more so during the time when the Single
European Market was created at the end of the eighties and the beginning of the nineties,
cross-border water management made major progress since within such a positive
discursive environment politicians on all levels were keen on making progress in water
management in order to present themselves as important and useful players within the
European space.
In consequence, the direction to which the sign value of water contributes (either
conflict and war or collaboration and policy innovation) depends strongly on the general
political context.
Nevertheless, it seems clear that water is not just a neutral medium for creating
social images of groups and institutions but it has a preordination to serve as a powerful
symbol.
•

Water is connected to specific places and the people who care about these places (as
land owners or as conservationists) have a strong interest in water politics – this gives
water management a high economic and political significance. The existential and
emotional attachment of many people to water made water politics a forerunner in
environmental politics. Disputes on water were giving birth to the environmental
movement that is now seen as an indispensable element of a civil and democratic
society.

•

Water is at the same time characterized by it fluidity. This provides for the need and
the opportunity for social and trans-territorial interaction. At the beginning, this fluid
character of water makes it a difficult task for management in modern times of
territorial order – nevertheless, over time, joint water management helps to build

1

Lash & Urry (1994): Economies of signs and space. London: Sage
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bridges across territorial communities – an essential goal in itself in a globalizing
world. The environmentalists from Lake Constance have started a few years ago to
build a global network among environmentalist who care about conservation issues at
important lakes in order to share their experiences and learn from each other (“Living
Lakes”, http://www.livinglakes.org/)
So, I end up with the proposal that a fourth social goal/value of water that should
be added to the three goals put forward by Howe and Ingram:
Global democracy, based on
• a strong civil society, and on
• trans-territorial communities and institutions.
See transparency 5.
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Transparency 5.

An additional social goal / social value of water:
•

Environmental sustainability (= absolute limits of use)

•

Economic efficiency (= cost-benefit-ratio)

•

Social equity (= distribution of costs and benefits among the people)

+ Trans-national democracy
political mobilization, civil society
motivation and legitimacy for trans-national community and institution building
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